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Abstract 
In countries where governments’ disproportionate power over the bureaucracy is coupled with a 
strong political polarisation, can votes for the national incumbent party “buy” preferential policy 
treatment and faster regional economic growth? The article tests such question on Turkey’s 81 
provinces over 2004-2012. Results uncover a link between votes and faster regional growth, as well as 
a small influence of preferential allocations in explaining it. Yet, after addressing potential 
endogeneity, economic performance is almost entirely explained by standard drivers, primarily human 
capital endowment. Results suggest that the impact of electorally motivated distributive politics on 
regions’ economic performance is extremely limited.  
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Votes and regional economic growth. Evidence from Turkey 
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of political institutions in ensuring the efficient functioning of markets 
and consequently fostering economic performance has become central in much of the 
literature dealing with economic growth and development. A growing consensus in particular 
agrees on how one of the key prerequisites for sustained economic growth is the existence of 
inclusive institutions preventing narrow political groups to monopolise public resources and 
economic power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In spite of such burgeoning interest on the 
politics of economic growth, the research specifically exploring the impact of political 
articulations on regional economic development has been significantly scarcer. Recently, the 
work by Bugra & Savaskan (2012, 2014) on the links between politics, religion and business 
has provided evidence suggesting that in polities lacking inclusive political institutions and 
where businesses are more reliant on state intervention – i.e. many emerging countries around 
the world –, governments may influence sub-national economic performance via the 
privileged provision of State goods to constituencies with the right political affiliation, at the 
expenses of opponents. Yet, such hypothesis has not received extensive empirical attention. 
The existence of such gap in the literature is particularly puzzling considering the literal 
‘explosion’ of research exploring distributive politics (Golden & Min, 2013), i.e. how 
politicians selectively targets constituencies with more or less governmental monies and 
goods to reinforce their electoral advantage. While distributive politics have been explored on 
an increasing number of countries and governmental goods, almost no studies have so far 
explored their final economic implications. 
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The current article aims at filling this gap by defining a political economy model of 
regional growth and testing it to Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012. Turkey’s case is 
informative because the country has traditionally suffered from social and political 
polarisation and considerable subordination of the bureaucracy to incumbent politicians. First 
of all, the results can inform the burgeoning literature on distributive politics by providing a 
preliminary assessment of whether such ‘allocative’ games’ have any economic 
consequences. The research can also contribute to the academic debate about the link 
between institutions and regional economic growth (Farole, Storper, & Rodríguez-Pose, 
2011) by assessing whether, and to what extent, votes and partisan articulations may 
influence subnational economic performance. Last but not least, if in the last fifteen years 
Turkey has undergone a significant number of institutional reforms aimed at strengthening 
the public governance, recent literature (Bugra & Savaskan, 2014; Meyersson & Rodrik, 
2014) has underlined – once again – the strong links between politics and economic 
development in the country. Assessing to what extent political cleavages between opponents 
and supporters of the central Government influence sub-national economies can therefore 
shed further light on the form of such links. 
Baseline results, obtained with a Fixed Effect estimator, confirm the existence of a 
reduced-form relationship between votes for the central Government and regional economic 
growth. The electoral support provided by each province to the incumbent party is correlated 
to faster rates of regional economic growth, particularly in provinces where the electoral race 
is closer. The preferential allocation of developmental Government goods to provinces – 
namely public investment and public investment incentives to the private sector – partly 
explains such relationship. Yet, the overall effect of electoral politics on economic growth is 
very modest. Besides, once the potential endogeneity between the dependent variable and the 
regressors is accounted for with an Instrumental Variable strategy, regional economic 
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performance appears as almost entirely explained by standard socio-economic factors, 
primarily human capital endowment. Results are robust to the inclusion of standard variables 
which may drive regional economic growth, as well as to the inclusion of factors specifically 
able to control for the structural change that Turkey’s emerging economy is undergoing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two provides a review of 
the literature on the link between political representation and regional economic growth, 
offers an overview of Turkey’s political cleavages and regional economic performance, and 
sets the research hypotheses. Section three defines a political-economy model of regional 
growth, and discusses the empirical variables used to estimate the model, the data, as well as 
the identification strategy. Section four presents, and then discusses, the results. Section five 
eventually draws the discussion to a conclusion. 
 
2. Exploring the link between votes and regional economic growth 
2.1. Votes and economic growth  
The impact of political parties, elections and national political institutions on 
macroeconomic performance has been increasingly explored by scholars in the last twenty 
years (Boix, 1998; Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 2006; Sen, 2013). In 
parallel to such political economy literature carried out at the national level, a considerable 
amount of research has been conducted at the sub-national level. This second corpus of work 
has frequently stressed the role of local political coalitions and local political 
entrepreneurialism in shaping governance structures conducive to economic growth 
(Apaydin, 2012; Bayirbag, 2011; Wood & Valler, 2004; Wood, 2008). In spite of those two 
separate bodies of research, very little research has been carried out to cross cut them and 
specifically explore how votes and partisan articulations may influence local and regional 
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economic development via their role in the construction of societal cleavages and the 
distribution of state goods.  
The existence of such gap in the literature is particularly puzzling considering the vast 
amount of literature on distributive politics, i.e. on how self-interested politicians may lead to 
heterogeneously distribute public spending and other state goods to specific groups at the 
expenses of others to gain electoral advantage (Golden & Min, 2013). A growing body of 
research linking economics and political science has indeed explored how public resources 
are frequently distributed on the basis of ‘purely political’ considerations (Persson, 1998). 
Such literature has explored the distribution of goods as various as regional grants and federal 
spending (Case, 2001; Larcinese et al., 2012; Tekeli & Kaplan, 2008), trade and industrial 
policy (McGillivray, 2004), infrastructure investments (Cadot et al., 2006; Castells & Solé-
Ollé, 2005; Golden & Picci, 2008; Kemmerling & Stephan, 2008), investment incentives 
schemes (Yavan, 2012), poverty reduction programmes (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 
2012; Fried, 2012; Kroth, Larcinese, & Wehner, 2014), international aid (Briggs, 2014), and 
the EU cohesion policy (Bouvet & Dall’Erba, 2010; Kemmerling & Bodestein, 2006).1 Yet, 
in spite of a literal ‘explosion’ of research on distributive politics, very little research has so 
far explored the final economic impacts which such preferential allocations may determine. 
Levitt & Poterba (1999) provide a seminal attempt to explore a research hypothesis similar to 
ours. They explore the link between congressional representation and state economic 
performance in the US. While they uncover a positive correlation between sub-national 
economic growth and the seniority of Democratic congressmen representing States at the 
federal level, they are unable to find any causal explanation for it. Given the sizeable effect 
that electoral politics may have on the design and implementation of developmental policies, 
there is yet reason to expect that votes and partisan articulations may influence not only the 
allocative policy outputs, but also their final outcomes, namely economic performance.  
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This may be particularly true in the emerging markets (Cadot et al., 2006), where public 
capital and state support to the business environment are likely to play a key role – bigger 
than in rich economies – in triggering the private capital accumulation process.2 Besides, in 
such environments lower levels of bureaucratic capacity and stronger informal consensus 
building practices (Özcan, 2000, 2006) frequently reduce the incentives/capacity to prevent 
the political use of public monies (Evans, 1995). Recently exploring the political economy of 
state-business relations in the emerging world, Bugra & Savaskan (2012) put exactly forward 
empirical evidence suggesting that tense partisan relations between the subnational and the 
central governments may influence local and regional economic performance via the 
Government’s preferential treatment of its partisan supporters. The evidence collected by the 
two authors suggests that the national Government may ‘punish’ political opponents via 
channels such as: (1) the provision of particular incentives to neighbouring aligned regions so 
as to stimulate private investments’ relocations; (2) the restrainment of public investments for 
the development of key, necessary infrastructures; (3) and, last but not least, the mobilization 
of legislative and administrative mechanisms aimed at a favourable treatment of only aligned 
business groups. 
A key assumption behind such hypotheses concerns the importance of political 
cleavages as catalyst for the formation of economic ones. Since the seminal work by Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967), social scientists have extensively studies the link between social 
cleavages and party systems. According to the two authors’ theoretical framework, party 
systems reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the social cleavage structure existing in a 
specific society. The number of cleavages is hence considered a key predictor of the number 
of parties. Furthermore, the intensity of such social cleavages is also assumed as a 
determinant of the intensity of partisan polarisation, an important dimension that 
distinguishes moderate and highly polarised party-systems.   
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2.2. Political cleavages, state support, and economic performance in 
Turkey 
Turkey is described in the literature as a polity where incumbents have frequently 
provided privileged treatment to people and constituencies with the right political affiliation 
and punished opponents (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013b; Heper & Keyman, 2006). Political 
polarisation has been one of the most serious and persistent maladies of Turkish political 
system, with pro- and anti-government groups frequently opposing each other (Ozbudun, 
2013).
3
 In spite of periods such as the 1990s during which fragmentation and volatility 
weakened the role and coherence of the party system, throughout Turkey’s republican history 
Turkish political parties have in general displayed a high degree of saliency in the political 
arena (De Leon, Desai, & Tugal, 2009). Sharing similarities with other Southern European 
countries such as Italy and Greece (Lanza, Lavdas, 2000), interest politics and party politics 
have frequently showed strong links.  
Furthermore, in line with the experience of other late-industrialising countries around 
the world, the Turkish state has traditionally played a key role in fostering the process of 
private capital accumulation and economic development (Eraydin & Armatli-Köroglu, 2005). 
The role of central government policies and state manufacturing firms behind the emergence 
of industrial districts in previously economically marginal areas is for example well 
documented (Eraydin, 2001). Bayırbaǧ (2010, 2011)’s research on the complex rescaling 
interlinks between Gaziantep’s local economic coalitions and the central level indirectly 
provides evidence on the importance of the central state in shaping local and regional 
economic development trajectories. Qualitative evidence collected by Bugra and Savaskan 
(2012) for recent years suggests that business groups with strong links to the government 
experienced better economic performance than ones opposed to it, thanks to preferential 
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treatment in the allocation and management of public resources and other goods such as 
public tenders. Preliminary evidence collected by the two authors leads to suggest that such 
concerns may apply not only to individual business groups but also to entire constituencies. 
They in particular uncover the fear of local and regional actors about feeling penalized by the 
government for systematically voting for the main opposition party (Cumhuriet Halk Partisi, 
Republican People’s Party, CHP, as opposed to the Adalet ve Kalkima Partisi, Justice and 
Development Party, AKP) in both local and national elections.
4
  
Although the weight of the Turkish State’s direct intervention in the economy has 
shrunk since the 1980s (Aricanli & Rodrik, 1990), an abundant amount of literature has 
provided theoretical and empirical evidence showing how the role of the state in influencing 
the economic and business environment has not diminished. The evidence include qualitative 
and case-study investigations on the State-business relations (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013b; 
Bugra & Savaskan, 2014), as well as econometric analyses on the impact of public capital on 
regional productivity ( Deliktas, Önder, & Karadag, 2008; Karadag, Deliktas, & Önder, 
2004). Furthermore, the country still remains one of the most centralised public finance 
systems among OECD countries (Blöchliger & Rabesona, 2009). Many of the final decisions 
affecting regional development are still largely in the hands of Turkey’s central Government, 
which may hence use such power to implement vote buying strategies.  
[Figure I about here] 
The map presented in Figure I shows how the patterns of regional economic growth 
during the last decade have been consistently heterogeneous. The group of regions which 
experienced the highest average annual growth rates of per capita GVA during 2004-2012 
include both some of the poorest NUTS II regions such as Mardin (8 percent per annum), 
Erzurum (4.5 percent per year) and Ağrı (4.3 percent per year), as well as middle income 
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regions such as Manisa (4.9 percent per year), Balıkesir (4.5 percent per year), Malatya (4.1 
percent), and Kırıkkale (4.1 percent).  
Figure I also shows the average percentage of votes cast for the AKP in national 
elections between 2002, 2007 and 2011. 2002 elections are interpreted as a turning point in 
Turkish politics as they witnessed a dramatic turnover among the political class and the 
substantial rise of the newly formed AK Party, which has kept increasing its power thereafter. 
Since then, the political scene has been mostly dominated by such party. The distribution in 
Figure I shows the marked spatial heterogeneity of the electoral support to the AKP, with 
average results across the three electoral tournaments ranging from 10 percent to more than 
63percent.  
The consolidation of Turkey’s political spectrum following 2002 has in particular 
marked the crystallisation of a pre-existing fault line, running in parallel to the contraposition 
between the pro-Islamic constituencies and the secular, Kemalist supporters. Compared to the 
European countries studied by Lipset & Rokkan (1967) Turkey’s social system has 
maintained its relatively lower number of cleavages (Ozbudun, 2013). Such division of 
Turkey’s society dates back to the late Ottoman period and the early republican years, and is 
at the core of the ‘preferential treatment’ hypothesis being tested in the analysis. One of the 
most established metaphors used to depict such cleavage describes Turkey as a country 
divided between a political centre – constituted by the State bureaucracy, the military, and the 
historical urban elites – and a large periphery – including the lower classes and rural 
environments, frequently with more conservative and Islamic traditions (Mardin, 1973). The 
strongly non-confessional State building project started by the founder of the Republic M.K. 
Atatürk, and subsequently advocated by the CHP had traditionally been one carried out by 
the centre. Since the 1980s, two socio-economic changes started rearranging the power 
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balance and composition of such cleavage. First, a massive wave of internal migration 
towards the main urban areas transformed the spatial equilibrium between the centre and the 
periphery. Since centre and periphery are not spatially differentiated any more, authors have 
recently renamed the societal cleavage as one between “White Turks”, representing  the 
former group, and “Black Turks”, representing the less-educated, lower-class with frequently 
peasant roots and stronger links to religion (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013a). Second, and 
most important, the economic rise of provincial Anatolian towns – the so-called Anatolian 
Tigers – led by a new capitalist class with rural origins and which identify themselves as 
pious capitalists – or “Islamic Calvinists” (ESI, 2005) – started altering the distribution of 
economic power between the two groups. Importantly for our analysis, the AK Party’s 
political success eventually marked the electoral victory of the latters over the formers.  
2.3. Research hypothesis 
Following the literature discussed in the previous sections, the main hypothesis tested 
by this article states  
H.1: Constituencies voting for the incumbent party grow faster than others, thanks to a 
preferential treatment received in the management of governmental public and private goods.  
In spite of hypothesis H.1, other research conducted on the impact of political and 
social factors in influencing local economic performance may suggest that partisan politics in 
general is not relevant to explain regional economic growth. According to Rodríguez-pose 
(1998)’s results, regional growth in Western Europe is largely accounted for by “standard” 
factors such as physical and human capital, innovative capacities, and socio-demographic 
regional characteristics, rather than by electoral politics. The alternative hypothesis thus puts 
socio-economic factors at the heart of regional economic performance. It states 
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H.A: Electoral politics does not drive regional economic performance, which is instead 
explained by standard socio-economic factors of growth. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. A political-economy model of regional economic performance 
The aim of this section is to briefly describe a theoretically-driven, political-economy 
model of regional economic growth. Drawing from earlier political economy research 
(Besley et al., 2010), follows this growth model: 
ΔYi,t = β0Yi,t-1 + β1Pi,t-1 + β2P
2
i,t-1 + β3Gi,t-1 + β4Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                    (1)                                                                                       
Where:  
ΔYi,t is the rate of per-capita economic growth, expressed in logarithmic terms, of 
province i at time t and Yi,t-1  is the yearly lagged provincial per-capita GVA (gross value 
added),
5
 included to test for Solow-style convergence of per-capita income, with β < 0 
indicating convergence. 
Pi,t-1 is the key variables of the model and is aimed at measuring the votes casted in 
each province for the incumbent governing party. In particular, we want to test whether β1 > 
0, i.e. whether higher votes for the central government drives higher growth rate of provincial 
personal income.  
Within the literature on the link between partisan votes and distributive politics 
literature a classic debate has flourished on whether Governments target goods to partisan 
strongholds (Cox & McCubbins, 1986) or, by contrast, to swing constituencies (Dixit & 
Londregan, 1996). Recent research on Turkey’s public investment provides evidence in 
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favour of the first hypothesis (Luca & Rodríguez-Pose, 2014). The inclusion of Pi,t-1  exactly 
captures such relationship. Yet, even within core-supporters models, utility-maximising 
politicians may decide to reduce their support to core constituencies above and below a 
certain votes’ threshold. In other words, combining Cox & McCubbins (1986) Dixit & 
Londregan (1996)’s models, the relationship between the amount of goods distributed and 
partisan support may be non-linear and inverse-U shaped, as found in the case of the 
European regional structural funds allocations (Bouvet & Dall’Erba, 2010). Such non-
linearity implies that the preferential treatment tends to increase where political competition 
is higher. Anecdotal evidence supporting such argument in the Turkish context is offered, for 
example, by a Parliamentary speech delivered in 2012 by a legislator from the province of 
Kütahya. In such occasion, the Member of Parliament complained how the province had been 
“forgotten” in the distribution of State resources and had been left behind in terms of 
development (Ișık, 2012), in spite of its exceptionally strong electoral support given to the 
governing party – which exceeded 60 percent in both 2007 and 2011 elections. Hence, P2i,t-1 
is included to control for possible non-linearity in the relationship between P and ΔY. The 
literature also argues in favour of a positive link between greater local political competition 
and higher growth rates (Besley et al., 2010), driven by the positive effects of competition on 
the quality of policies implemented. In the final part of the paper we will hence test the 
robustness of our results to the replacement of P
2 
with a more traditional measure of 
provincial electoral competition, namely how close the electoral race is.  
Gi,t-1 is included to control for the heterogeneous allocation of governmental goods 
across provinces. Concretely, G accounts for total public investment and investment 
incentives to the private sector, two key policy tools adopted by the Turkish Government to 
foster regional economies. The first part of section 4 will provide empirical evidence to show 
that Government supporters receive a preferential treatment in the allocation of key public 
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resources necessary for development. The inclusion of G in the model will then help testing 
whether any links between electoral results and economic growth is indeed driven by 
distributive politics. If this was true, adding G into the equation should lead to a decrease in 
the magnitude of the electoral variable’s coefficients, since their effect would now be picked 
up by the former. 
Xi,t-1, consists in a vector of socioeconomic controls which, according to the literature, 
may also play a role in influencing the dynamics of economic growth, such as private, public 
and human capital investments. While much of growth theory ignores the existence of 
productivity gaps between existing activities in the economy, in developing countries growth 
traditionally takes place through the movement of labour from low-productivity to high-
productivity sectors. In the last decades, Turkey has indeed experienced significant trends of 
structural economic transformation (Altug et al., 2007), with a significant shift of work-force 
from traditional sectors such as agriculture to manufacturing and, more recently, services. 
Such process has played a consistent role in the increase of total productivity. Turkey’s 
average productivity in manufacturing, for example, currently exceeds the one in agriculture 
almost by a factor of three (Rodrik, 2010). Structural change, in particular, has been 
responsible for 45percent of the labour productivity growth in Turkey between 1990 and 
2005 (Rodrik, 2010). To control for such trends, the vector Xi,t-1 will also include four key 
variables able to account for such structural socio-economic change, namely the share of 
manufacturing in the regional economy, the level of regional entrepreneurship, the level of 
rural population and the total provincial population. 
αi and nt respectively consist in province fixed- and time-effects, and ɛi,t  is the error 
term.  
3.2. Empirical variables 
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The variables selected for the empirical estimation of equation (1) are described in the 
following paragraphs. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of provincial per-
capita GVA, expressed in per capita Turkish Lira at 2012 prices and in logarithmic terms. 
The selection of absolute growth rates provides a methodology which allows an easy and 
straightforward interpretation of results. Robustness tests will further explore whether results 
hold when regional growth is measured in relative terms to the country mean.
6
  
A one-year lag between left- and right-hand side variables is included to account for the 
time necessary for political variables to potentially influence economic outcomes. This means 
that the length of the panel decreases from 9 to 8 years. Among the regressors, lagged output 
Yi,t-1 is followed by the model’s political variable  
Votes: the variable measures the share of votes casted for the governing AK Party in 
national elections. The decision not to focus on results from local elections is motivated by 
the fact that administrative elections are frequently based on local political issues, while 
national elections provide a better picture of the overall partisan closeness of a province to 
the central Government. Following the conceptual discussion in section 2.2, the squared 
variable is also included to account for the non-linear relationship we expect to find between 
votes and regional economic growth. 
 The third group of variables is included to control for the hypothesised preferential 
allocation of governmental goods to aligned constituencies. It includes 
Public capital investment: total amount of public fixed-capital investment to each 
province.
7
 Values are expressed in per capita Turkish Lira (TL) at 2012 prices and in 
logarithmic terms. 
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Investment incentives to the private sector: total number of investment incentive 
certificates annually distributed by the State to private businesses, per 1000 inhabitants. 
Values are expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Finally, the socio-economic control variables accounted for in the analysis are 
Entrepreneurship: Acemoglu & Robinson (2013b) suggest that the beginning of the 
AKP government in 2002 may have witnessed an opening of economic opportunities to 
Anatolian entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs, often with conservative and religious 
backgrounds, previously disfavoured by the strongly non-confessional bureaucracy. 
According to such hypothesis, the beginning of the AKP government may thus have ‘levelled 
the economic playing field’ by broadening the geographical and social basis of 
entrepreneurship (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013b). The inclusion of entrepreneurship into the 
equation should help controlling for such trends and for any spurious correlation between 
political variables and economic performance not related to the partisan preferential treatment 
hypothesis. In the absence of any other viable indicators, the variable is proxied by the annual 
variation in the total number of economic units per 1000 inhabitants.   
Human capital stock: this variable is proxied by the percentage level of education in the 
labour force. While analyses conducted in more technologically-advanced countries 
customarily account for ISCED 5-6 levels, our analysis focuses on ISCED 3-4 levels. First, 
the overall levels of education attainment in Turkey are still comparatively low. The average 
level of schooling for the workforce, for example, was in 2005 at 5.3 years, i.e. 2/3 years less 
than many other countries at a similar level of economic development (Altug et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, considering that a key driver of economic growth has been manufacturing in 
industries characterised by low/medium technological skills, ISCED 5-6 levels are not likely 
to capture the potential impact that human capital may play in economic development.  
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Manufacturing employment share: manufacturing employment shares will capture one 
of the core sectors contributing to the transformation of Turkey’s economy. The importance 
of manufacturing in the economic development of Turkey’s regions has particularly increased 
since the 1980s, as many new industrial centres emerged in Anatolia. 
Rural population: this indicator is aimed at capturing the structural transformation of 
the Turkish socio-economic system is the percent of provincial population living in rural 
districts. In a country such as Turkey characterised by late development and a rapid, recent 
urbanisation, the regional developmental inequalities are likely to be correlated with the 
urban/rural divide. 
Private capital investment: gross regional investment in tangible goods is aimed at 
controlling for the role private capital accumulation may play in economic growth. Values are 
expressed in per capita Turkish Lira (TL) at 2012 prices. 
Total provincial population: last but not least, provincial population is aimed at 
controlling for potential indirect effects on economic performance. 
A final note should be devoted to social capital. A large body of regional growth 
literature has shown the role played by social capital and associability in economic 
development (cf. Iyer, Kitson, & Toh, 2005; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). Unfortunately, 
regionalised data on measures of social capital is not available for the period of study. 
Somehow reassuringly for the research, commenters have argued that the role of civil society 
organisations in Turkey has been traditionally modest. Kalayicioglu for example suggests: “A 
tolerant, trusting, active public, vigorously seeking greater influence over political authorities 
through conventional political participation, still seems a long-term goal in Turkish politics. 
[…] In short, the overall record indicates that associability is still a relatively scarce 
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commodity in the Turkish culture” (Kalaycioğlu, 2001, pp. 60, 62). While we have reasons to 
believe that, particularly in the last two decades, civic activism may have increased, we 
unfortunately have no data to control for. Interestingly, data on the total number of civil 
society organisations recorded by the Civil Society Development Centre’s database 
(www.stgm.org.tr, accessed on April, 15, 2015) as of 2015, the only available year, shows a 
significantly high correlation to provincial population: the pairwise correlation coefficient 
between number of civil society organisations and provincial population is above 91 percent 
(significant at the 0.01 confidence level).     
3.3. Data  
The analysis employs a panel data set covering 81 Turkish provinces over the period 
2004-2012. We will focus on changes in NUTS II regions income, rather than provinces 
(NUTS III level) income, thus assigning to each province the value of its corresponding 
NUTS II region. Alas, even if NUTS II regions do not correspond to any administrative tier, 
in 2001 the Turkish Statistical Institute ceased reporting economic data for provinces and 
started instead reporting values at NUTS II level. In absence of any other viable solution, 
such strategy follows earlier literature. Levitt & Poterba (1999) points to the fact that the use 
of economic outcome data at an administrative layer higher than the political variables’ one 
may be good for capturing economic spill-overs from potentially powerful legislators that 
accrue to residents outside their strict electoral constituencies.  
Political variables are collected at the provincial level. We focus on provinces because 
they constitute the power bases of political parties, one of the most important tiers of political 
representation in Turkey (Guvenc & Kirmanoglu, 2009), and the only administrative tier 
between municipalities (and metropolitan municipalities) and the central State. Electoral data 
for 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections was gathered from the European Election Database. We 
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annualise political variables by extending electoral results over each legislature’s single year. 
Electoral wards within metropolitan provinces are not taken into account and therefore 
national elections’ data is only collected for provinces.  
All the other socio-economic controls are collected at provincial level when available 
or at NUTS II level otherwise. A detailed description of variables, their key summary 
statistics, and pairwise correlation coefficients are respectively provided in Appendixes I, II 
and III. 
3.4. Identification strategy 
Our baseline empirical strategy to explore the link between votes and regional 
development is to estimate equation (1) adopting a heteroscendasticity and autocorrelation 
robust estimator with province and annual fixed effects. Such strategy should attenuate the 
risk of spurious correlations between left- and right-hand side variables caused by unobserved 
characteristics – such as the local economic structure or the level of cohesiveness/conflicts 
among the local business community, as well as any other shocks that may affect both the 
electoral results and the economic performance.
8
  
To control for potential serial and spatial correlation, estimations adopt robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level (NUTS III level, 81 clusters). Errors are 
clustered at NUTS III, rather than NUTS II level, not only because we believe the former is a 
more important tier, but also because the latter only includes 26 units and such low number 
may not guarantee consistent results. 
While the within-estimator should help controlling for potential omitted factors, a 
second and more important cause of concern in the estimation of equation (1) is the 
endogeneity of the political variables. We consider 2002 electoral results as exogenous. After 
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almost a decade of rampant corruption, poor economic performance and infighting under 
coalition governments, 2002 elections are considered as a real turning point in Turkish 
politics (Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2010; Zeyneloglu, 2006) . The combined share of votes for the 
five main parties in 1999 elections was 81 percent, while it dropped to a mere 24 percent in 
2002 (Akarca & Baslevent, 2011). Figure II shows the turnover rate of MPs after each 
election. The rate, which is constructed dividing the number of newly elected MPs by 
reconfirmed ones, shows how 2002 rate has been the highest in Turkey’s democratic history.9  
[Figure II about here] 
The literature on distributive politics underline that voters may reward or punish 
politicians on the basis of their past allocations of the budget – retrospective voting models – 
or on the basis of their promises about the future – prospective voting models (Larcinese et 
al., 2012). If the latter were true for Turkey, then also 2002 results would suffer from 
endogeneity since voters’ expectations in 2002 would be correlated to the future preferential 
treatment by the central Government. In a politically very unstable environment where 
politicians frequently did not keep their pledges (as it was likely after the 1990s), we argue 
that the risk of endogeneity due to prospective voting is low.  
Yet, in the case of subsequent results endogeneity is a serious issue, since electoral 
outcomes at time t are likely to be influenced by economic performance at time t and time t-1. 
Our solution to identify the genuine causality between votes and economic performance is to 
adopt an instrumental variable approach. To this aim we design a shift-share instrument 
drawing from the seminal strategy proposed by Bartik (1991) and since then increasingly 
used to identify sources of exogenous shocks in spatial economics literature (e.g.: Moretti, 
2010). The theory behind the instrument is that national vote pattern changes that are party-
specific but external to an individual province reflect exogenous political shocks for that 
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province. Concretely we construct the instrument by weighting nib, which represents the 
initial electoral result for each province i in the base year b (2002), for the national variation 
between time t and the base year b: 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝑛𝑖𝑏 ∗ (1+ 
𝑁𝑡− 𝑁𝑏
𝑁𝑏
) 
The inclusion of the endogenous political term in quadratic form in equation (1) poses a 
further challenge. Since adding any linear variable as second instrument would lead to a 
poorly identified model, our solution is to instrument the quadratic term of the endogenous 
variable with the quadratic term of the main instrument, as suggested by Woodridge (2010). 
4. Results 
We present the results in two main steps. First, in Section 4.1 we briefly provide 
evidence on the link between votes for the incumbent party and the heterogeneous allocation 
of governmental goods. Second, we extend the analysis from policy outputs to outcomes, to 
investigate whether the preferential treatment of the Government’s supporters influence 
regional economic performance. Section 4.2 presents the baseline FE results, while section 
4.3 shows the outputs obtained with the IV specification. Sections 4.4 provide further 
robustness tests, while finally section 4.5 discusses the overall results. 
4.1. Votes and development policy 
Extensive evidence on the distributive politics of Turkey has already been provided by 
earlier pieces of literature. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2014) in particular explore the drivers 
of public investment across Turkey’s provinces for the same period considered in this article. 
While they stress how politics does not topple socioeconomic factors in the allocation of 
public investment, they show how political criteria have nonetheless played an important role 
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in influencing investment allocations at the advantage of the Government’s supporters, and at 
the expenses of opponents. Following their methodology, we estimate the link between 
partisan articulations – proxied by votes in national elections – and the geographical 
distribution of public investment and investment incentives to the private sector. The 
equation we estimate takes the following form 
Gi,t = β1Pi,t-1 + β2Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                                                           (2)   
Where G is the amount of goods distributed by the central Government; P is the 
electoral support given to the main parties, as well as a measure of electoral competitiveness; 
X is the vector of socio-economic controls discussed in section 2.2; α and n respectively 
consist in province fixed- and time-effects, and ɛ is the error term. Again, we include a one-
year lag between left- and right-hand side variables. Our aim is to provide exploratory 
evidence. Table I shows the empirical results. Columns (1) and (2) refer to public investment, 
while columns (3) and (4) refer to investment incentives to the private sector. As already 
stressed earlier, these are two of the key components behind Turkey’s regional development 
policy, as well as the preferential treatment hypothesis.   
[Table I about here] 
As expected, the amount of public investment and investment incentives to the private 
sector allocated to each province is positively and statistically significantly correlated to the 
electoral support for the national incumbent Government. Such evidence is robust against the 
inclusion of the socio-economic controls.   
4.2. Robust Fixed Effects estimates 
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The aim of this section is to answer the core question of the analysis and explore 
whether the effect of partisan articulations on policy choices extends to regional economic 
performance.  
[Table II about here] 
Table II presents the results. Province and year effects, as well as the lagged dependent 
variable, are included across all models. The overall fit of the models is good, with a ‘within’ 
adjusted R
2
 reaching 68.4 percent in the full specification.  
In line with the main hypothesis, column one shows a positive and significant 
correlation between the percentage of support given to the governing party, the AKP, and the 
rate of per capita regional economic growth. As expected, the inclusion of the quadratic 
electoral term in column 2 determines a neat increase in the statistical significance of the 
correlation between the percentage of votes casted for the AKP and the rate of per-capita 
GVA annual growth rate. This finding confirms that such correlation is significantly inverse-
U shaped rather than linear.   
[Figure III about here] 
The fitted line shown in Figure III is based on the estimates from column 2 and the 
observed range of AKP values. It clearly shows how the marginal increase in GVA growth 
tend to reduce with the increase in the level of support to the central Government, turning 
negative for values above around 70 percent of votes.                                                                                     
The main research hypothesis argues that the correlation between the electoral variables 
and the regional growth rate is driven by distributive politics, i.e. the Government’s 
preferential treatment of politically aligned provinces in the allocation of key developmental 
resources. If that was true, adding public infrastructural investment and the amount of public 
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investment incentives provided to the private sector – two key State goods behind the 
preferential treatment hypothesis – into the equation should lead to a decrease in the 
magnitude of the electoral variable’s coefficients, since their effect would now be picked up 
by the newly added variables. Column 3 of Table II shows that this is partly the case. Among 
public investment and investment incentives to the private sector only the latter is significant. 
Their inclusion determines a reduction in the magnitude of the AKP coefficient. At the same 
time, it is necessary to acknowledge that in absolute terms such reduction is low. 
Interestingly, a bigger reduction in the AKP coefficient occurs when the control variables are 
included in column 4.
10
  
The socio-economic control variables show the expected sign, as well as a high level of 
statistical significance: entrepreneurship, human capital, the share of manufacturing 
employment, the rate of rural population,  private investment and total population appear all 
positively correlated to regional economic growth (although the latter is insignificant). 
Unexpectedly, the most relevant coefficient across the models is by far human capital, whose 
magnitude is significantly higher than all the others – even after taking into account 
differences in the variables’ units of measurement.  
4.3. Instrumental Variable estimates  
The following paragraphs discuss the results obtained with the Instrumental Variable 
strategy. Table IV shows the models’ estimates following the same order as table II, while 
Table III shows the first stage regression coefficients for the full model of column 4. 
[Table III about here] 
The relevance condition for the instruments is met: the first stage F-test of excluded 
instruments is above 10 (i.e. the customary rule-of-thumb value), while the instruments are 
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strong and statistically significant predictors of the main endogenous variable to be 
instrumented. Furthermore, all the F-tests of excluded instruments for each of the models 
shown in Table IV are satisfactorily close to 10.
11
  
[Table IV about here] 
The estimates presented in Table IV reflect relatively closely the ones shown in Table 
II. At the same time, the political variables’ magnitude and level of statistical significance are 
now both reduced. This suggests that the Fixed Effects estimates for the political variables 
are partly influenced by endogeneity. The causal effect of partisan closeness to the central 
Government in driving faster regional economic performance appears with the expected sign, 
yet it turns significant only after the non-linearity is accounted for, i.e. when its quadratic 
term is included in the regression (column 2 of Table IV). Furthermore, the comparison 
between Figures III and IV clearly shows that after controlling for endogeneity, the causal 
effect’s magnitude appear even smaller, reaching its inverse-U shape’s peak at an earlier level 
of the AKP values’ distribution. For electoral result values higher more or less than 55 
percent (i.e. less than one standard deviation from the mean), the overall net effect between 
the linear and quadratic political terms now turns even negative. Such finding is in line with 
the theoretical predictions discussed in section 3.1, since the Government is more likely to 
provide stronger favouritism to constituencies where the electoral races are tight compared to 
provinces either completely lost or secured. 
[Figure IV about here] 
Similarly to what observed with the FE estimates public investment is positively 
associated to regional economic growth but is insignificant. By contrast, the level of 
investment incentives offered by the State to the private sector is both positive and significant 
as in the FE estimates. Including public infrastructure investment and investment incentives 
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to private firms – two of the channels through which the impact of electoral variables should 
influence economic performance – in model 3 of Table IV determines a reduction in the 
coefficient and significance of AKP. As before, it is also worth noting that a similar reduction 
in the AKP coefficients also occurs when the controls are included in the full model (column 
4). In other terms, the correlation between partisan closeness to the central Government and 
regional economic growth indeed seems explained, to a very small extent, by the preferential 
allocation of public investment and incentives. Yet, another significant portion of it is 
explained by spurious factors. 
Most of the other coefficients included in models 4 appear with the same sign and 
statistical significance as in Table II. Entrepreneurship, human capital, manufacturing 
employment share and private capital investment are significant drivers of economic growth. 
The only exception is provincial population, which now turns negative yet retains its 
insignificance.     
4.4. Robustness checks   
This last empirical section is aimed at providing some robustness checks on the results 
discussed above.  
As discussed in section 3.1, our main analysis included the square of votes for the 
incumbent party to test for the effects of higher/lower political competition. A first test 
checks whether results are robust against the replacement of P
2
 with a more traditional 
measure of provincial electoral competition (Besley et al., 2010). The variable, named Close 
race, is constructed as the negative of the absolute value of the vote difference between the 
incumbent party and its main challenger in each province. The challenger is the second party 
where the AKP is the leading one or the first party when the AKP is not the first one. As we 
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take the negative of the absolute value, we will expect the variable to show a positive value, 
meaning that regional growth is higher in provinces where the vote difference is lower. The 
new results, presented in Appendix IV, confirm the prediction and are very similar to our 
original ones. Tests not included but available on request indeed show that if Close race is 
included along with our original P
2
 variable, the latter turns highly insignificant. As a matter 
of fact, the pairwise correlation between the two variables is close to 74 percent (significant 
at the 0.01 confidence level).  
Second, it is well known that in dynamic models – i.e. equations characterised by the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors – FE estimates are 
potentially biased in the order of 1/T (Nickell, 1981). To rule out any potential concerns, this 
final section estimates the same models discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 but excluding their 
dynamic components, i.e. including the dependent variable in levels instead of first difference 
while excluding the lagged convergence term from the regressors. The new equation takes the 
following form:  
Yi,t = β1Pi,t-1 + β2P
2
i,t-1 + β3Gi,t-1 + β4Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                         (3)   
Appendix V shows the results obtained estimating equation (3). The results are overall 
consistent to the ones from the dynamic model specifications. The socioeconomic controls 
are mostly uninfluenced from the different specification. Across the FE estimates, the key 
electoral variables of the model behave similarly as before. Their statistical significance is 
nonetheless further: after the inclusion of the full list of controls, neither AKP, nor its squared 
term, are significant at a standard confidence level. The political variable and its square term 
show the expected sign across the IV estimates, yet they are insignificant. Interestingly the 
square term turns significant after the inclusion of the controls, but only at the 10 percent 
level. Considering the dramatic dynamism of Turkey’s regional economies during the period 
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of study we believe that the estimates obtained from the dynamic model and discussed in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are likely to be more reliable. At the same time, however, the fact that 
the main hypothesis failed to pass the robustness test further weakens the evidence supporting 
the picture of Turkey as an economy where partisan factionalism does not play a big role in 
regional economic performance.  
While we considered the 2002 electoral results as exogenous, they may be correlated to 
previous elections held in the 1990s, in the sense that politicians elected in the mid-1990s 
from ‘old’ parties may have switched to the newly founded AKP (while skipping the 1999 
legislature).
12
 To address such potential concern, a third robustness test excludes the 2002 
electoral results from the analysis, hence restricting the panel to the period 2007/2012, for 
which our instrument allows – by construction – to identify a source of political variation 
which is exogenous to provinces. Results are presented in Appendix VI. Interestingly, results 
are overall very similar to the ones from the full panel. All the coefficients show the expected 
signs, and the shift from the FE to the IV estimator marks as expected a reduction in the 
explanatory power of the endogenous political variables. 
A final test aims at checking the robustness of results against the exclusion of Istanbul, 
Ankara, and Izmir, Turkey’s three biggest cities and economic hubs. The results, presented in 
Appendix VII, show that coefficients are virtually identical to the ones of the full 
specification.
13
   
4.5. Discussion 
Overall, the results suggest the existence of a positive, inverted-U shaped relationship 
between the provincial votes for the central Government and the rate of per capita GVA 
growth. They also provide preliminary evidence that such relationship seems – at least partly 
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– driven by the heterogeneous distribution of State goods across provinces, as put forward in 
the theoretical section. At the same time, however, the magnitude of such influence is small, 
not robust in our third specification, and in any case considerably less relevant than the one of 
the other socio-economic controls. Once the potential endogeneity between votes and 
regional growth is controlled for, the causal effect of the Government’s preferential treatment 
to electorally aligned constituencies in driving faster regional economic performance is even 
smaller. Such result is relevant as it shows that, while there are still modest signs of the 
preferential treatment hypothesis, much of the correlation between votes and regional growth 
in the baseline specification is actually driven by reverse causality. In other words, the 
correlation we uncover in the baseline specification is likely to be driven by the electoral 
support given by fast-growing provinces to the central Government party – a finding which 
confirms earlier research on the role of positive economic performance in reducing electoral 
volatility (Akarca & Tansel, 2006) – and only partially by faster growth rates triggered by the 
Government’s preferential treatment of politically aligned constituencies.  
The results’ implications are threefold. The first concerns the academic and policy 
debate about distributive politics. While the amount of research asking whether and how 
political actors use their control over government resources to strengthen their electoral 
advantage has experienced a literal ‘explosion’ in recent years (Golden & Min, 2013), almost 
no studies had so far explored how distributive and ‘allocative games’ may influence not only 
policy outputs, but also their final economic outcomes. If earlier studies uncovered clear 
signs of strategic manipulation over the allocation of Turkey’s public investment (Luca & 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2014), the good news emerging from the current research is that the final 
impact of votes – via distributive politics – on economic performance is significantly small, 
and in any case much less relevant than the other socio-economic controls. Such finding is 
potentially relevant to other countries with high political polarisation and high levels of 
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electorally-motivated distribution of public goods, and where there are hence concerns that 
cities and regions opposing the incumbent governments may suffer in long-term economic 
performance. Confirming earlier attempts to measure the impact of electoral factors on 
regional development (Rodríguez-pose, 1998), our results are reassuring since they suggest 
that regional economic growth is largely explained by structural socioeconomic factors, and 
only very marginally by electoral idiosyncratic determinants.   
Second, the most relevant predictor of Turkey’s regional per-capita GVA growth is 
interestingly human capital, whose effect is significantly higher than all other variables. 
Confirming preliminary findings put forward by Filiztekin (2009), such result is relevant in 
that it contributes to overcoming the lack of knowledge stressed in the literature about the 
role played by education and human capital in Turkey’s economic performance (Altug et al., 
2007). Such results carry relevant implications not only for the academic research but also for 
policy. Although recent public expenditure on education has increased, Turkey still ranks at 
the bottom of the OECD members’ list both in terms of education attainment as well as 
public education expenditure (Bardak & Majcher-Teleon, 2011). Under this light, our results 
suggest that an increase in the public education expenditure would bring not only social 
(Dinçer, Kaushal, & Grossman, 2014) but also significant economic benefits. The importance 
of increasing public investment in education is even higher considering that Turkey has not 
yet achieved full literacy, and education attainments still lags behind many comparator 
countries. For example, in 2009 the rates of population aged 15-64 with Lower secondary 
(ISCED 0-2), Upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) and Tertiary (ISCED 5-6) education were 
respectively 70.8/19.2/10.0 in Turkey while 27.6/53.2/19.2 in Bulgaria, 39.8/40.2/20.0 in 
Greece and 31.5/46.4/22.1 in the EU-27 average (ibid.).  
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Last but not least, the results speak to the debate on the extent to which Turkey is 
progressing towards the achievement of more democratic and inclusive institutions. 
Throughout its republican history Turkey has traditionally suffered from fragmented politics 
and factionalism. Following the economic crisis of 2001, as well as the start of Accession 
Negotiations to the EU, the country started a series of public reforms inspired by good 
governance principles and democratic accountability. The policy path followed by Erdoğan’s 
AK Party succeeding its electoral victory in 2002 has been largely depicted by international 
media as a commitment to such democratisation process. Yet, the concrete extent of such 
process is debated. While criticising Erdoğan’s recent autocratic stance, Acemoglu (2014) 
shows optimism about Turkey’s long-term democratic prospects. In the economic realm, 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2013b) go further by hypothesising that the beginning of the AKP 
government in 2002 may have witnessed an opening of economic opportunities to Anatolian 
entrepreneurs with conservative and religious backgrounds, thus broadening the geographical 
and social basis of entrepreneurship (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013b) and providing new 
scope for Turkey’s economic growth. Although in a preliminary way – given the scope for 
misspecification in a simple political economic regional growth model –, our findings may 
indeed support Acemoglu & Robinson (2013b)’s claims. Unfortunately the available data 
does not allow us to carry out the analysis for the most recent years, during which tensions 
between the supporters and the opponents of the government have escalated and the 
autocratic and confrontational tone of former Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan 
have increased dramatically. If drawing strong conclusions from our limited evidence is 
probably incorrect, it is at least fair to say that our results provide a picture of Turkey’s 
economy during the 2000s where partisan factionalism had modest effects and did not topple 
standard drivers of regional growth.  
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While the analysis provides a relatively positive picture about the impact of political 
cleavages on Turkey’s economy, such picture should not however be confounded with 
optimistic narratives about Turkey’s overall institutional dynamics. First, quantitative 
analyses carried out at regional level can capture aggregate territorial effects but falls short in 
uncovering informal channels through which state-economy relations may manifest. As 
underlined by Piattoni (2001), interest politics should not be seen in monolithic terms but, 
rather, as a ladder that climbs upward according to the level at which particular interests are 
aggregated: at the lowest possible level, determining clientelism and cronyism networks 
pivoting around individuals; and at higher levels determining, among others, pork-barrelling 
practices based on constituencies and local communities, and consociationism based on 
religious or ethnic groups. Our analysis only captures the last two. An alternative hypothesis 
is that the effects of the government’s preferential treatment may have influenced individual 
people and business groups, rather than entire territories. For example, what may really 
dependent on political favouritism may not be the allocation of monies across provinces but, 
rather, the award of favours to specific, individual business groups. Bugra & Savaskan (2014) 
and Ozcan & Gunduz (forthcoming) provide for example evidence in this direction. Second, 
some commenters have recently argued that optimistic narratives about Turkish 
socioeconomic change fail to uncover a de-facto institutional deterioration (Meyersson & 
Rodrik, 2014). In other words, a possibility is that positive performance in the economic 
realm has been coupled with a deterioration of political and democratic liberties. Under such 
light positive economic performance may indeed explain why the constant increase in 
Erdogan’s autocratic stance has not led to a decrease in his electoral success. Yet, the 
strongly confrontational and autocratic stance adopted by Erdoğan in recent years (Arbatli, 
2014; Meyersson & Rodrik, 2014) may mark a lost opportunity to capitalize any positive 
societal achievements in the long term.  
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Two further caveats are in point. First, the analysis has focused its attention on party 
politics, grounding such decision in the significant amount of research stressing the role of 
parties in capturing the key Turkish political cleavages likely to influence the economic 
environment. Political parties in Turkey have traditionally stood “out as the penultimate 
political institution of populist patronage” (Kalaycioğlu, 2001, p. 63). Yet, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that there may be other political dimensions as much as relevant as partisan 
articulations. Buğra (1998) and Buğra & Savaşkan (2014) have for example pointed to the 
role of business associations as key societal fault-line markers. While they acknowledge how 
“the impact of these two types of actors [parties and business organizations] on the economic 
environment is not exercised through separate channels, but appears the outcome of strategies 
that mutually support each other” (Bugra & Savaskan, 2014, p. 31), further quantitative 
research on business associations would ideally complement our analysis on partisanship.
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Last but not least, our theoretical model and empirical strategy explore the link between votes 
and regional economic growth under a single-party government, so we don’t have evidence to 
assess what results could be expected under a coalition government. Drawing from the 
distributive politics literature, our speculation is that the link between votes, allocation of 
state goods and regional growth would be more complex. Analyzing the distribution of 
Turkey’s investment incentives during the 1990s – a period marked by coalitions among very 
heterogeneous political parties – Kemahlioglu (2008) for example shows that allocative 
patterns were not aimed at favoring core constituencies, but rather at punishing coalition 
partners with the goal of preventing them from claiming credit of the benefits allocated. We 
would hence expect that such complexity may be mirrored in the final link between votes and 
regional economic growth.     
5. Conclusion 
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The analysis of institutions in ensuring the efficient functioning of markets and in 
consequently fostering economic development has become a key topic in the literature on 
economic growth and development (cf. Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). In spite of such burgeoning 
interest, the research specifically exploring the impact of political institutions on regional 
economic development has been significantly scarcer. In particular, almost no studies have so 
far explored how votes and partisan cleavages may impact on local and regional economic 
development. To bridge such gap the article tested whether, in countries where governments’ 
disproportionate power to influence the bureaucracy is coupled with strong political 
polarisation, the economic performance of regions and constituencies politically close to the 
incumbent governments may benefit from a preferential treatment in the management of state 
resources, and may thus experience faster economic growth. The analysis first assessed the 
link between votes for the incumbent national party and the amount of public developmental 
resources channelled to provinces, uncovering a clear pattern of preferential distribution of 
resources to core constituencies. Second, it defined a political economy model of regional 
growth and tested it to Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012. The empirical strategy is first 
based on a Fixed Effect estimator. To rule out the potential risk of reverse causality and 
omitted variable bias, we then adopt a shift-share Instrumental Variable strategy inspired by 
the work of Bartik (1991).  
The results of the analysis lead to both good news and bad news. The bad news is the 
fact that pork-barrelling and the partisan closeness to the central Government seem 
effectively to influence sub-national economic growth. Compared for example to the case of 
France studied by Cadot et al. (2006), who did not found any effect of pork-barrelling on the 
final economic performance of French regions, our results partly confirm the concerns put 
forward in Turkey by Bugra & Savaskan (2012) and Heper & Keyman (2006). The good 
news emerging from the research is that the impact of votes on regional economic 
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performance is significantly small and in any case considerably less relevant than the one of 
other more ‘standard’ socio-economic drivers of growth. Furthermore, after controlling for 
the potential reverse causality between dependent and explanatory variables, the causal effect 
of electoral politics on regional economic performance appear even smaller. In other words, 
the correlation we uncover in the baseline specification between votes for the Governing 
party and regional growth is likely to be driven by the electoral support given by fast-growing 
provinces to the central Government, and only partially by the Government’s preferential 
treatment of politically aligned constituencies. Considering the concerns of cities and 
provinces not voting for the national incumbent party of being penalised in long-term 
economic opportunities, results are reassuring.  
While the analysis provides a relatively positive picture about the impact of political 
cleavages on Turkey’s economy, such picture should not be confounded with optimistic 
narratives about the country’s overall institutional dynamics. Commenters have increasingly 
documented the autocratic and authoritarian stance adopted by Turkey’s former Prime 
Minister and current President Erdoğan in recent years (Arbatli, 2014; Meyersson & Rodrik, 
2014). Under such light, the positive economic performance experienced in many provinces 
may indeed explain why the constant increase in Erdogan’s autocratic stance has not led to a 
decrease in his electoral success. In line with the pre-AKP period (Akarca & Tansel, 2006), 
results seem to confirm the importance of economic growth as one of the factors explaining 
the constant electoral success of the AKP since 2002. Yet, in the long term, the strongly 
confrontational and autocratic stance adopted by the former Prime Minister/new President in 
recent years may mark a lost opportunity to capitalize any positive societal achievements 
from the first years in power.   
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Interestingly, the research also uncovered that across the socioeconomic variables 
human capital – measured as percentage of the workforce with upper secondary education – 
appears as the most relevant predictor of per-capita Gross Value Added growth. Although 
recent public expenditure on education has increased, Turkey still lags behind and ranks at 
the bottom of the OECD members’ list both in terms of education attainment as well as 
public education expenditure (Bardak & Majcher-Teleon, 2011). A stronger focus on human 
capital accumulation as a strategy for regional development may hence bring not only social 
but also significant economic benefits. Besides, given the role of the central state in providing 
education at the sub-national level, this is perhaps one further area of enquiry into the 
political economy of development in Turkey and elsewhere. 
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1
 In their extensive analysis of the literature Golden & Min (2013) have found more than 150 articles on the 
topic. Our review of the literature even increases such count. 
2
 Scholars such as Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004) provided exhaustive theoretical frameworks and empirical 
evidence for understanding the salience of active developmental state intervention in emerging and late-
industrialising economies. 
3
 The start of armed clashes between the Turkish State and the outlawed PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has produced another main transversal cleavage opposing Turkish nationalists to 
supporters of the Kurdish movement (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). The current article focuses exclusively on the 
first one.   
4
 The other main parties since the early 2000s have been the nationalistic National Action Party (Milli Hareket 
Partisi, MHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barıș ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), which 
succeeded to the Democratic Society Party (Demokrat Toplum Partisi, DTP) outlawed in 2008. 
5
 GVA may not be the best variable to measure regional economic growth, in that it does not capture the effect 
of state taxes and transfers on final income. Aware of such shortcoming, we are left with no other option due to 
data availability. Data limitation is – alas – one of the biggest problems in empirical research, particularly in 
emerging countries. Section 3.3 provides specific details on why GDP data at sub-national level is not available 
in Turkey for the last 15 years’ period.  
6
 We thank one anonymous referee for raising such suggestion.  
7
 A large proportion of investments is registered as multi-provincial, so it is not possible to match it with any 
specific province. Over 2004-2012, multi-provincial projects accounted on average for 45.67percent of the total 
public investment portfolio, with an annual standard deviation from the period’s overall mean of 5.10. In 
absence of any viable solution to mitigate such data flaw, we follow earlier pieces of literature (Celebioglu & 
Dall’erba, 2010; Deliktas et al., 2008; Karadag et al., 2004) and only concentrate on the investments which can 
be matched with single provinces.  
8
 To further control against omitted variable biases we have also tried including the interaction between time and 
fixed effects. Estimates not presented in the paper but available on request show that results do not change.   
9
 2002 AKP electoral results may nonetheless be correlated to electoral results in the mid-1990s. We thank one 
anonymous referee for raising such important point. Robustness checks will hence test whether the exclusion of 
2002 elections from our panel influences the empirical results.  
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10
 Results not presented here but available on request shows that the reduction in the AKP coefficient is in 
particular driven by the inclusion, among the controls, of rural population.  
11
 The F-tests here reported refer to the endogenous variable’s quadratic term.  
12
 We thank one anonymous referee for bringing such point to the fore.  
13
 Further tests not presented in the article but available on request show that results are equally stable if we 
further exclude the other second-tier economic centres of Turkey, namely Adana, Antalya, Kocaeli and Bursa. 
14
 One key, empirical issue preventing from carrying out such an analysis is – alas – the lack of extensive data 
on business associations.  
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Figure I. Average AKP results and annual growth rates of GVA (2004-2012). Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Figure II. Parliamentarians’ turnover rate (newly elected/reconfirmed MPs) at each election. Circled are post-
1960 and post-1980 military coups, 2002 elections. Source: own elaboration. 
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Figure III. Fitted line of the relationship between percent of votes for the AKP and the annual regional per-
capita GVA growth rate (2004-2012): robust FE estimates from column 2 of Table II. Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
Figure IV. Fitted line of the relationship between percent of votes for the AKP and the annual regional per-
capita GVA growth rate (2004-2012): IV estimates from column 2 of Table IV. Source: own elaboration. 
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Table I. The link between central public infrastructure investment/investment incentives to the private sector 
and votes for the national incumbent party: robust Fixed Effects estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Public investment Investment incentives 
     
AKP 0.0207** 0.0123* 0.0220*** 0.0159** 
 (0.00846) (0.00721) (0.00733) (0.00670) 
CHP -0.0176** -0.0160** 0.00382 0.00439 
 (0.00745) (0.00725) (0.00650) (0.00658) 
MHP 0.0126 0.0172 -0.0327*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0104) 
Kurdish party 0.0150 0.0112 0.00739 0.00467 
 (0.00930) (0.00823) (0.00643) (0.00608) 
Close race 0.000209 -0.00262 0.00275 0.000854 
 (0.00326) (0.00320) (0.00293) (0.00252) 
Constant 4.314*** -5.631 -3.667*** -1.522 
 (0.397) (5.233) (0.377) (5.222) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.159 0.191 0.409 0.436 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Controls no yes no yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: 
Regional per-capita GVA, entrepreneurship, human capital, manufacturing employment, rurality, private 
investment and population.  
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Table II. Multivariate regressions of the regional per-capita Gross Value Added growth rate: robust Fixed 
Effects estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.340*** -0.365*** -0.467*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0248) (0.0271) (0.0246) 
AKP 0.000810* 0.00194*** 0.00184*** 0.00107* 
 (0.000465) (0.000494) (0.000489) (0.000563) 
AKP^2  -1.26e-05* -1.30e-05* -8.22e-06 
  (7.08e-06) (6.75e-06) (6.56e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00309 0.00243 
   (0.00230) (0.00228) 
Inv. incentives   0.00753*** 0.00641** 
   (0.00284) (0.00278) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00260*** 
    (0.000677) 
Human capital    0.266*** 
    (0.0881) 
Manufacturing    0.00227*** 
    (0.000804) 
Rurality    0.00219* 
    (0.00111) 
Private inv.    0.00148*** 
    (0.000293) 
Population    3.28e-06 
    (5.67e-06) 
Constant 3.130*** 3.151*** 3.390*** 4.160*** 
 (0.229) (0.225) (0.248) (0.227) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.632 0.637 0.675 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
Province FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Table III. First stage regression of the endogenous political variable: AKP’s electoral results (2004-2012). 
Estimates are presented for both the original (column 1) and quadratic term (column 2). 
 (1) (2) 
 AKP AKP^2 
   
GVA -2.619 -235.2 
 (6.770) (625.3) 
Public investment -0.0176 12.70 
 (0.355) (33.51) 
Investment incentives 1.240** 109.4** 
 (0.577) (44.82) 
Private investment -0.0161 -4.938 
 (0.0661) (6.612) 
Human capital -0.623 -463.7 
 (16.17) (1,537) 
Entrepreneurship 0.272** 23.90** 
 (0.106) (9.459) 
Manufacturing 0.00569 6.367 
 (0.110) (9.992) 
Rurality 0.771*** 65.81** 
 (0.274) (26.25) 
Population -0.00454*** -0.535** 
 (0.00172) (0.204) 
AKP_IV 1.547*** 347.4*** 
 (0.485) (56.25) 
AKP_IV^2 -0.0138*** -2.180*** 
 (0.00288) (0.378) 
Constant 0.152 -7,243 
 (62.55) (5,859) 
   
Observations 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.808 0.750 
F-test 51.57 32.58 
Province FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
                Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Table IV. Multivariate regressions of the regional per-capita Gross Value Added growth rate: Instrumental 
Variable estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged GVA -0.337*** -0.353*** -0.384*** -0.491*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0297) (0.0337) 
AKP 0.000541 0.00120* 0.00113* 0.000225 
 (0.000485) (0.000647) (0.000641) (0.000673) 
AKP^2  -2.03e-05*** -2.06e-05*** -1.28e-05** 
  (6.41e-06) (6.36e-06) (6.34e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00329 0.00241 
   (0.00205) (0.00197) 
Inv. incentives   0.0109*** 0.00880*** 
   (0.00292) (0.00279) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00281*** 
    (0.000709) 
Human capital    0.297*** 
    (0.0684) 
Manufacturing    0.00217*** 
    (0.000668) 
Rurality    0.00320*** 
    (0.00112) 
Private inv.    0.00170*** 
    (0.000445) 
Population    -1.69e-07 
    (1.07e-05) 
Constant 3.155*** 3.299*** 3.615*** 4.374*** 
 (0.257) (0.265) (0.276) (0.301) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
First stage F 13.81 9.38 9.82 10.28 
Province FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Appendixes 
Appendix I. Variables: review of main hypotheses and their operationalization  
Variable Description Unit  Source 
Gross Value 
Added 
Per capita gross value added (GVA) at 
2012 prices.  
Ln, TL at 
2012 prices TURKSTAT Regional Database 
AKP 
Percentage of votes to the central 
governing party (AKP) in national 
elections (2002, 2007, 2011) 
Percent 
points European Election Database  
Close race 
Negative absolute value of the vote 
difference between the incumbent party 
and its main challenger in each province 
Percent 
points Own calculation 
Public 
investment 
Per-capita fixed capital investments in 
transport and infrastructural networks 
allocated to each province 
Ln, TL at 
2012 prices 
Own calculation on data from the 
Ministry of Development 
Investment 
incentives  
Number of investment incentive 
certificates annually awarded to private 
firms per 1000 inhabitants Ln count 
Own calculation on data from the 
Ministry of Economy 
Entrepreneurship 
Net annual variation in regional economic 
units per 1000 inhabitants Count 
Own calculation on data from 
TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Human capital 
Percentage of economically active 
population (Labour force) aged 15 years 
old and over with upper secondary 
education (ISCED 3-4) 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Manufacturing  
Percentage of workforce aged 15 years 
and over employed in manufacturing 
(NACE Rev. 1) 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Rurality 
Percentage of population living in rural 
district within each province 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Private 
investment 
Annual variation in per-capita total 
private investment in tangible goods 
1000 TL at 
2012 prices 
Own calculations on data from 
TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Population Total provincial population 1000 people 
TURKSTAT Regional Database, 
OECD 
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Appendix II. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
GVA growth 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.16 
GVA 9.36 0.39 8.55 10.14 
AKP 45.04 14.81 6.50 84.82 
Close race -25.40 15.16 -70.4 -0.10 
Public investment  3.03 1.42 0.00 9.21 
Investment incentives -3.17 0.63 -6.91 -1.70 
Entrepreneurship 1.01 2.56 -6.28 6.87 
Human capital 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.31 
Manufacturing 20.96 9.44 4.70 46.30 
Rurality 37.85 13.68 1.01 70.08 
Private investment 728.11 3006.66 -20214.25 17152.98 
Population 891.44 1497.70 65.13 13624.24 
Appendix III. Pairwise correlations among variables 
 GVA  
growth 
GVA AKP Close 
race 
Public 
Inv. 
Inv. 
Inc. 
Entrepr. Human 
capital 
Manuf. Rurality Private 
Inv. 
Pop. 
GVA growth 1 
(0.000) 
           
GVA -0.093* 
(0.017) 
1 
(0.000) 
          
AKP -0.078* 
(0.047) 
0.071 
(0.054) 
1 
(0.000) 
         
Close race -0.001 
(0.991) 
0.120* 
(0.001) 
-0.596* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
        
Public inv. 0.016 
(0.678) 
0.101* 
(0.006) 
0.205* 
(0.000) 
-0.098* 
(0.003) 
1 
(0.000) 
       
Inv. incentives 0.221* 
(0.000) 
0.437* 
(0.000) 
0.248* 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.951) 
0.156* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
      
Entrepreneurship 0.280* 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.816) 
-0.103* 
(0.009) 
0.057 
(0.146) 
-0.015 
(0.701) 
0.019 
(0.625) 
1 
(0.000) 
     
Human capital 0.034 
(0.389) 
0.599* 
(0.000) 
-0.051 
(0.173) 
0.033 
(0.375) 
0.117* 
(0.002) 
0.143* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.577) 
1 
(0.000) 
    
Manufacturing -0.044 
(0.295) 
0.659* 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.507) 
0.056 
(0.158) 
0.0191 
(0.628) 
0.303* 
(0.000) 
-0.050 
(0.207) 
0.521** 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
   
Rurality 0.047 
(0.269) 
-0.437* 
(0.000) 
-0.137* 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.378) 
-0.230* 
(0.000) 
-0.272* 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.414) 
-0.448* 
(0.000) 
-0.555* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
  
Private inv. 0.256* 
(0.000) 
0.101* 
(0.005) 
-0.037 
(0.352) 
0.047 
(0.234) 
-0.036 
(0.363) 
0.124* 
(0.002) 
0.233* 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.413) 
0.118* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.916) 
1 
(0.000) 
 
Population -0.039 
(0.314) 
0.293* 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.956) 
0.120* 
(0.000) 
0.080* 
(0.006) 
0.082* 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.423) 
0.231* 
(0.000) 
0.324* 
(0.000) 
-0.526* 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.136) 
1 
(0.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05 
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Appendix IV. Multivariate regressions of the per capita Gross Value Added growth rate: FE and IV estimates 
adopting an alternative measure of electoral competition (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.343*** -0.366*** -0.469*** -0.337*** -0.344*** -0.370*** -0.480*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0269) (0.0244) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0330) 
AKP 0.000810* 0.00105*** 0.000918*** 0.000502 0.000541 0.000399 0.000324 -0.000247 
 (0.000465) (0.000328) (0.000324) (0.000322) (0.000485) (0.000432) (0.000433) (0.000456) 
Close race  0.000421*** 0.000411*** 0.000282**  0.000281* 0.000287* 0.000111 
  (0.000148) (0.000140) (0.000129)  (0.000167) (0.000165) (0.000169) 
Public inv.   0.00318 0.00247   0.00329* 0.00238 
   (0.00233) (0.00227)   (0.00199) (0.00193) 
Inv. incentives   0.00709** 0.00614**   0.00834*** 0.00723*** 
   (0.00282) (0.00277)   (0.00282) (0.00272) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00256***    0.00272*** 
    (0.000686)    (0.000697) 
Human capital    0.269***    0.278*** 
    (0.0870)    (0.0667) 
Manufacturing    0.00226***    0.00228*** 
    (0.000792)    (0.000652) 
Rurality    0.00226**    0.00314*** 
    (0.00108)    (0.00112) 
Private inv.    0.00145***    0.00158*** 
    (0.000293)    (0.000437) 
Population    4.09e-06    2.95e-06 
    (5.63e-06)    (1.04e-05) 
Constant 3.130*** 3.198*** 3.426*** 4.183*** 3.155*** 3.229*** 3.485*** 4.273*** 
 (0.229) (0.224) (0.246) (0.226) (0.257) (0.256) (0.266) (0.294) 
         
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.634 0.639 0.676 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 13.81 16.62 17.29 18.10 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Appendix V. Multivariate regressions of the per capita Gross Value Added growth rate: FE and IV estimates 
including the dependent variable in levels instead of first difference (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
AKP 0.000514 0.00247** 0.00214** 0.000520 -5.77e-05 0.00129 0.00107 -0.000818 
 (0.000937) (0.00114) (0.00106) (0.000935) (0.000689) (0.000954) (0.000907) (0.000829) 
AKP^2  -2.18e-05 -2.18e-05 -7.38e-06  -4.09e-05*** -3.85e-05*** -1.35e-05* 
  (1.52e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.07e-05)  (9.42e-06) (8.95e-06) (7.86e-06) 
Public inv.   0.0102*** 0.00476*   0.0101*** 0.00456* 
   (0.00311) (0.00267)   (0.00287) (0.00243) 
Inv. incentives   0.0203*** 0.0115***   0.0258*** 0.0148*** 
   (0.00450) (0.00403)   (0.00401) (0.00343) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00278***    0.00310*** 
    (0.000866)    (0.000879) 
Human capital    0.469***    0.502*** 
    (0.0969)    (0.0830) 
Manufacturing    0.00726***    0.00678*** 
    (0.00127)    (0.000737) 
Rurality    0.00424**    0.00569*** 
    (0.00197)    (0.00138) 
Private inv.    0.00142***    0.00176*** 
    (0.000425)    (0.000552) 
Population    2.37e-06    -2.72e-06 
    (9.04e-06)    (1.33e-05) 
Constant 9.238*** 9.201*** 9.236*** 8.858*** 9.257*** 9.266*** 9.314*** 8.870*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0245) (0.0334) (0.0756) (0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0319) (0.0562) 
         
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.747 0.750 0.769 0.837 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 15.13 13.24 13.74 13.92 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Appendix VI. Multivariate regressions of regional per capita Gross Value Added growth rate: FE and IV 
estimates limiting the panel to the period 2007-2012. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.412*** -0.412*** -0.434*** -0.498*** -0.411*** -0.415*** -0.443*** -0.510*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0364) (0.0405) (0.0396) (0.0345) (0.0349) (0.0365) (0.0399) 
AKP 0.000685 0.00344*** 0.00336*** 0.00218*** 0.00138* 0.00253*** 0.00248*** 0.000920 
 (0.000661) (0.000659) (0.000691) (0.000722) (0.000749) (0.000948) (0.000945) (0.000990) 
AKP^2  -3.07e-05*** -3.07e-05*** -2.16e-05**  -3.91e-05*** -3.94e-05*** -2.69e-05*** 
  (9.24e-06) (9.25e-06) (9.08e-06)  (9.17e-06) (9.14e-06) (9.35e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00159 0.00162   0.00185 0.00205 
   (0.00229) (0.00238)   (0.00228) (0.00225) 
Inv. incentives   0.00634* 0.00489   0.00830** 0.00667** 
   (0.00343) (0.00343)   (0.00328) (0.00321) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00297***    0.00353*** 
    (0.000856)    (0.000866) 
Human capital    0.211**    0.256*** 
    (0.103)    (0.0933) 
Manufacturing    0.00155**    0.00122 
    (0.000748)    (0.000827) 
Rurality    0.00449***    0.00548*** 
    (0.00168)    (0.00174) 
Private inv.    0.000840***    0.00105** 
    (0.000313)    (0.000481) 
Population    -1.83e-05*    -2.77e-05 
    (1.04e-05)    (1.98e-05) 
Constant 3.849*** 3.802*** 4.020*** 4.389*** 3.815*** 3.869*** 4.149*** 4.523*** 
 (0.326) (0.344) (0.384) (0.382) (0.322) (0.326) (0.343) (0.358) 
         
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.658 0.672 0.674 0.698 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 16.66 12.09 12.02 12.03 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Appendix VII. Multivariate regressions of regional per capita Gross Value Added growth rate: FE and IV 
estimates excluding Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.341*** -0.365*** -0.466*** -0.338*** -0.354*** -0.384*** -0.488*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0275) (0.0245) (0.0284) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0342) 
AKP 0.000785* 0.00195*** 0.00185*** 0.00111* 0.000560 0.00123* 0.00115* 0.000296 
 (0.000460) (0.000494) (0.000491) (0.000579) (0.000489) (0.000658) (0.000652) (0.000710) 
AKP^2  -1.30e-05* -1.33e-05* -8.71e-06  -2.02e-05*** -2.04e-05*** -1.32e-05* 
  (6.99e-06) (6.68e-06) (6.68e-06)  (6.49e-06) (6.45e-06) (6.71e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00343 0.00273   0.00360* 0.00267 
   (0.00239) (0.00238)   (0.00212) (0.00203) 
Inv. incentives   0.00757** 0.00664**   0.0107*** 0.00893*** 
   (0.00290) (0.00277)   (0.00296) (0.00283) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00289***    0.00310*** 
    (0.000673)    (0.000735) 
Human capital    0.264***    0.294*** 
    (0.0878)    (0.0692) 
Manufacturing    0.00225**    0.00214*** 
    (0.000858)    (0.000690) 
Rurality    0.00206*    0.00303*** 
    (0.00115)    (0.00115) 
Private inv.    0.00150***    0.00171*** 
    (0.000305)    (0.000451) 
Population    -3.73e-06    -7.41e-06 
    (2.68e-05)    (2.60e-05) 
Constant 3.127*** 3.154*** 3.383*** 4.146*** 3.150*** 3.305*** 3.601*** 4.349*** 
 (0.233) (0.231) (0.250) (0.226) (0.262) (0.269) (0.279) (0.306) 
         
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 
Number of id 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.633 0.640 0.682 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 13.93 9.62 9.94 10.40 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
 
 
